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31 Octo 62

COLOMBIA: Crisis expected in the cabinet within the next three days. President Valencia's two month old government is under fire for not taking forceful action against rural banditry, but also there are personal animosities and jealousies -- some of this brought into open by dissension over supporting US stand on Cuba. Valencia pro-US on matter; Defense Minister Ruiz hanging back.

State Department review completed

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[redacted] cables report

the USSR has requested clearance for a flight of an IL-18 carrying Mikoyan to Havana via ~~London~~^{UK} Canada, and New York. Mikoyan is to leave Moscow 1 November, stop over one day in New York and then proceed to Havana. No reason is given but it is speculated that he is to put pressure on Castro.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum




THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

31 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.



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31 October 1962

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THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Further analysis of low-level photography [redacted] provides clear evidence that construction and concealment have continued at the MRBM sites in Cuba since [redacted]. Limited and poor photography precludes a positive assessment of construction activity at IRBM sites. There is no evidence that the Soviets are dismantling or vacating any of the sites.

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Many of the missile erectors at the MRBM sites have been moved from their hardstands and are no longer visible. There is evidence that at least one of these erectors and most of the missile-associated equipment have been concealed in the woods. As long as missile erectors remain near the MRBM sites, their full operational capability is not affected.

Launch stands, cabling, and other launching components remain in place at each of the MRBM sites. Removal of the cabling would probably be the first step in dismantling operations.

Construction activity at [redacted] bunkers has continued [redacted] at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 2 and at San Cristobal MRBM Sites 1 and 3.

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Analysis of Soviet merchant ship movements indicates that it would take a minimum of two weeks, and more probably three, to assemble in Cuban ports those Soviet dry-cargo ships with hatches suitable for loading missiles.

Dismantling and movement of essential missile facilities to port areas could probably be accomplished within about 24 hours, but about a week would be required for loading.

Inside Cuba, the armed forces remain mobilized. Cuban radios have announced military exercises, which began yesterday and are to continue through 2 November.

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The Kronstadt-class subchaser that went aground near Banes on 28 October has still not been refloated.

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DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

4 U Thant's conversations with Castro yesterday went badly. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Cubans refuse any form of inspection or any foreign presence in their territory. U Thant still has hopes of "shaking them out" of this position in meetings set for this morning. If not, he may call a Security Council meeting for Thursday to seek more guidance.

Cuban propaganda themes yesterday strongly suggest that Castro is insisting that his "five points"--demands for major US concessions before any US non-aggression guarantee would be acceptable to him--be injected into UN discussions of the issue. Soviet propaganda media have begun to refer to these as "just Cuban demands."

[REDACTED]

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5 Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov yesterday again assured Ambassador Stevenson "emphatically" that the offensive missiles in Cuba would be dismantled and removed, after which verification could be undertaken by any means the US desired. He said Khrushchev had told him dismantling would take two or three weeks.

Kuznetsov referred several times to removal of US "bases which threatened the Soviet Union as they had removed their base in Cuba which threatened the US."

6 The UN Secretary-General's office has already been in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has agreed to inspect shipping reaching Cuba. The ICRC is thinking in terms of a staff of 30 which would be briefed in New York before beginning its work.

Foreign Minister Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler yesterday that the USSR wants to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters.

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Soviet UN officials appear to be trying to convince neutralist representatives that the lesson of the Cuban crisis is "the sinister nature" of all foreign bases and the need for their liquidation, in particular Guantanamo.

In the Geneva talks on a nuclear test ban, a Soviet delegate argued that the Cuban settlement reduces international tension to a point where the West should drop its demands for international controls and on-site inspection.

REACTION AND PROPAGANDA

Moscow propaganda expresses concern that the US still harbors aggressive intentions against Cuba and that Cuban exile groups are plotting against the Castro regime. Moscow has warned that the crisis has not ended and has called for "strict fulfillment" of US pledges of "noninterference in the internal affairs of Cuba."

Soviet propaganda thus far gives no clear indication of policy decisions concerning future diplomatic efforts. A Moscow commentator, however, has endorsed Castro's five demands of 28 October as "just proposals," and the East German Neues Deutschland also has called for the US to evacuate its Guantanamo base.

Additional themes which have received a fair amount of emphasis in Soviet broadcasts are calls for removal of the US quarantine of Cuba and for the removal of US missile bases in Turkey.

Izvestiya yesterday gave readers a relatively clear picture of Soviet withdrawal in the face of US threats, but otherwise Moscow has shown considerable sensitivity to suggestions of a Soviet retreat, hailing the settlement as "a major victory for Soviet policy."

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Chinese Communists are making their opposition to Soviet policy on Cuba increasingly clear. The editorial in today's People's Daily says that President Kennedy has given nothing but "empty promises" and that his "so-called assurance" against invading Cuba is only a "hoax."

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SOVIET MILITARY STATUS

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SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

[redacted] there are five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY and VLADIMIR), four Soviet dry-cargo vessels (BELOVODSK, E PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK and CHERNYAKOVSK) and one Czechoslovak dry-cargo vessel (KLADNO) en route to Cuba. [redacted] the GROZNY and the BELOVODSK were waiting, dead in the water, near the quarantine line. KLADNO was hove to in the same area [redacted] [redacted]

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Summary

October 31, 1962

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

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[REDACTED] the main difference we see is improved camouflage and concealment.

There is no indication of preparations to dismantle the sites.

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[REDACTED]

Some of the medium-range missile erectors have been removed from sight, but at least one of these is concealed in the woods near its previous position. As long as the erectors stay near their sites, full operational capability is not reduced.

②

[REDACTED]

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③

We estimate that it would take at least two weeks, more probably three, to assemble the Soviet ships we believe to be missile transporters in Cuban ports. The missile facilities could actually be torn down and moved to port in 24 hours, but loading would take a week.

④

U Thant's conversations with Castro yesterday made little headway. The Cubans refuse any form of inspection or foreign presence on their territory.

⑤

Kuznetsov, however, yesterday emphatically assured Ambassador Stevenson that the missiles will be dismantled and removed in two or three weeks, after which we can have any verification process we want.

⑥

The International Red Cross has agreed to provide inspectors for shipping reaching Cuba.

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⑦

Soviet diplomats and propagandists continue their efforts to broaden the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement to such matters as control of Cuban exile activities, and even the issues of Guantanamo and US missiles in Turkey.

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